South Africa stands at a crossroads, caught between the promise of continental integration through the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) and the reality of rising domestic hostility towards fellow Africans. The AfCFTA represents the most significant economic integration initiative on the continent, bringing together 1.4 billion people and a combined GDP of more than $3 trillion . Yet, the latest data paints a sobering picture: xenophobic incidents in South Africa reached 83 in 2024, up from 62 the previous year, and migrants make up only 3.9% of the country’s population . This article explores the tension between these AfCFTA-driven continental ambitions and the lived reality of xenophobia—and what the future might hold if South Africa commits fully to both the AfCFTA and its complementary free movement protocols.
The AfCFTA Dream: Integration Requires Mobility
The AfCFTA is not merely a trade agreement; it is designed to create a single market for goods and services, investment, and intellectual property . However, there is a fundamental reality that South Africa’s immigration debate often ignores: *goods do not move across borders by themselves—they are moved by people* . Entrepreneurs, engineers, truck drivers, IT specialists, and investors are the human engines of this integration. The success of the AfCFTA relies heavily on the seamless and regulated movement of people across borders .
The Protocol on Free Movement of Persons, adopted alongside the AfCFTA in 2018, was designed to make this possible . It aims to progressively implement three core rights: entry, residence, and establishment . According to the African Union, 32 member states have signed the Protocol, though only four—Rwanda, Niger, Mali, and Sao Tome and Principe—have ratified it . This low uptake is a “curious anomaly,” given that the parallel AfCFTA agreement is now in its operational phase .
The AU’s Economic, Social, and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC) has been clear: the success of the AfCFTA depends heavily on the seamless and regulated movement of people across borders . Dr. Oluwafemi Solomon, Programme Coordinator on Free Movement of Persons, stressed the need for greater political will, noting the creation of an AU model that maps the synergy between the AfCFTA and Free Movement Protocol to drive Africa’s growth . Free movement is seen as essential for the transfer of resources, labour, skills, and technology—all necessary for the AfCFTA’s success .
The Seeds of Distrust: A Continent Divided by Perception
To understand what will happen when South Africa moves closer to a visa-free regime aligned with the AfCFTA, one must first understand the roots of the current hostility. The data is stark: according to Statistics South Africa, the official unemployment rate stood at 31.4% in the final quarter of 2025, while the rate for young people aged 15-24 was 57% . In this climate of desperation, migrants become an easy scapegoat. A significant number of South Africans believe that irregular migration contributes to job competition, strain on informal markets, rising crime perceptions, and pressure on housing, healthcare, and other public services .
However, the data firmly contradicts these scapegoating narratives. According to South Africa’s own 2022 census, migrants are just 3.9% of the total population—approximately 2.4 million people in a country of 62 million . The wild claims of 15 million undocumented migrants are not supported by any credible evidence . As one commentator notes, “The wild claims of 15-million undocumented migrants are not supported by any credible evidence. You would see it in the schools, the hospitals and the housing data. You don’t” .
Despite these facts, the narrative persists. A post shared on X by a South African user captures the sentiment: “You can speak all you want at the African Union… it is our children being trafficked, our money being scammed, our kasi spaza businesses being taken, and our citizens kidnapped” . This is not a crisis of migration; it is a crisis of governance and unemployment, with migrants serving as visible targets for public anger.
The Contradiction: AfCFTA’s Promise vs. National Protectionism
This is where the tension becomes most acute. South Africa wants the benefits of selling its products in Lusaka, Nairobi, and Accra, but is “terrified of the mechanic, the nurse or the small-scale trader coming in the opposite direction,” as one commentator put it . This is not just hypocritical; it is self-defeating. As a signatory to the AfCFTA, South Africa is bound to implement certain obligations. The Protocol to the Agreement Establishing the AfCFTA on Investment is clear: state parties must “facilitate the granting of visas and permits to foreign workers, employees and consultants as designated by the investor” .
However, the South African government appears to be moving in the opposite direction. The African National Congress (ANC), which has traditionally championed Pan-African solidarity, is now backing significantly stricter immigration rules . Deputy President and ANC Secretary-General Fikile Mbalula stated that the party must address the “growing frustration” among South African citizens regarding the influx of undocumented workers . A White Paper on Citizenship, Immigration and Refugee Protection tabled in late 2023 proposed tighter border controls and more stringent visa requirements .
This creates a fundamental contradiction: the government is preparing to build a wall at the same time that the rest of the continent is building a highway . The EU didn’t start with open borders; it started with coal and steel. But as the economy integrated, labour mobility followed. As one analyst notes, “It turned out that you can’t build a continental supply chain if every time a specialist crosses a border they are treated like a criminal” .
The Cost: Trust Erodes, Integration Stalls
The consequences of this tension are already visible and threaten to undermine the AfCFTA itself. In a striking development, political activist Solomon Owusu and lawyer Andrew Appiah-Danquah filed a petition with the African Union seeking the removal of Wamkele Keabetswe Mene as Secretary-General of the AfCFTA Secretariat, arguing that his continued leadership is “inconsistent with the goals of African unity and integration because of South Africa’s record of xenophobic violence against fellow Africans” .
Their argument is telling: the Secretary-General serves “not only as an administrator but also as a symbol of the Pan-African vision” . The petitioners contend that the success of the AfCFTA depends on “trust among Africans and confidence that citizens can move, work, trade and invest across the continent without fear of discrimination or hostility” . This is not an abstract concern. Citizens from Ghana, Nigeria, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Ethiopia, Somalia, and the Democratic Republic of Congo have over the years suffered assaults, displacement, destruction of property, and other forms of violence during xenophobic attacks in South Africa .
The AfCFTA relies heavily on trust and mutual recognition between member states . If South Africa, the continent’s most industrialized economy, succumbs to internal fragmentation, the entire project faces significant headwinds . Persistent tensions could discourage progress in visa liberalisation, labour mobility agreements, cross-border entrepreneurship, and regional migration frameworks—all of which are essential for AfCFTA success .
What Will Happen When Visa-Free Access Becomes Reality?
So, what would be the consequences of implementing the AfCFTA-aligned vision of visa-free access for all Africans? The likely outcome is a complex mix of positive potential and severe social friction.
In the short to medium term, the political and social response would likely be severe. The current anti-immigrant sentiment is dominant and growing. Visa-free access would be perceived not as a step towards continental unity, but as a direct assault on the livelihoods and security of South Africans. The risk of large-scale xenophobic violence would increase dramatically . Politicians, particularly with elections approaching, would be tempted to exploit this fear for electoral gain . The underlying governance failures and economic desperation will not be solved by closing borders, but open borders would provide a highly visible target for public anger.
However, there is an alternative scenario. As one commentator notes, “The long-term solution to unmanaged migration is not a wall. It is a prosperous, stable, integrated Africa” . If the AfCFTA succeeds—if it actually builds regional value chains and creates jobs in neighbouring countries—people will move by choice, not desperation. The economic push factors that drive irregular migration will shrink .
This requires a fundamental shift in South Africa’s approach. The country cannot “demand access to African markets while denying African professionals access to ours” . A more nuanced approach that distinguishes between skilled professionals and informal traders, that strengthens border management while also facilitating legal mobility, could help balance competing pressures. The answer lies not in choosing between African integration and national sovereignty, but in finding a balanced and coordinated approach to migration and integration .
Conclusion: A Choice Between Fear and Fraternity
South Africa has a choice. It can retreat behind a laager, blame the foreigner for its own governance failures, and slowly become irrelevant as the rest of Africa trades around it. Or it can build a state strong enough to manage migration, confident enough to embrace integration, and smart enough to turn the AfCFTA into jobs for South Africans .
The AfCFTA represents Africa’s most significant economic integration initiative and is intended to promote intra-African trade, free movement of people and investment, and stronger cooperation among African countries . But economic integration is not driven only by treaties and policies; it is also driven by trust among citizens. If Africans fear violence or discrimination in other African countries, confidence in regional integration is weakened .
The responsibility for navigating this challenge lies not with the migrants seeking opportunity, but with the political and economic leaders who have allowed desperation to fester and who have used xenophobia as a tool for political survival. The choice is stark: embrace a future of continental integration and shared prosperity, or continue to allow fear to dictate policy, leading to further violence and a betrayal of the very ideals of a united Africa. As Nonkululeko Dlamini-Zuma recently argued, South Africa’s prosperity is tied to the prosperity of the continent—this is not just a social imperative; it is an economic necessity for the future of Africa .